

Fourth Quarter 2025





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ClearBridge



Economic Outlook



U.S. Recession Dashboard

- 12 variables have historically foreshadowed a looming recession
- The overall dashboard is currently signaling expansion

| | | <u>Current</u> November 30, 2025 | October 31, 2025 | 5* September 30, 2025 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Housing Permits | - | - | • |
| ner | Job Sentiment | × | × | × |
| Consumer | Jobless Claims | • | • | • |
| Ö | Retail Sales | - | • | • |
| | Wage Growth | - | • | • |
| | Commodities | 1 | • | † |
| Financial Business Activity | ISM New Orders | • | • | • |
| | Profit Margins | - | - | • |
| | Truck Shipments | 1 | • | • |
| | Credit Spreads | ± | • | † |
| | Money Supply | • | • | • |
| | Yield Curve | • | • | • |
| | Overall Signal | * | † | 1 |
| | ★ Exp | oansion • Caution | ≭ Recession ■ | Not Available |



*Jobless Claims, Retail Sales and Wage Growth were updated with data that had been delayed by the US government shutdown. 'Not Available' reflects data that has not been updated due to the government shutdown. Data as of Nov. 30, 2025. Sources: BLS, Federal Reserve, Census Bureau, ISM, BEA, American Chemistry Council, American Trucking Association, Conference Board, Bloomberg, CME, FactSet and Macrobond. The ClearBridge Recession Risk Dashboard was created in January 2016. References to the signals it would have sent in the years prior to January 2016 are based on how the underlying data was reflected in the component indicators at the time.



U.S. Recession Dashboard: Historical Lookbacks

- 12 variables have historically foreshadowed a looming recession
- The overall dashboard is currently signaling expansion


| | | Current | 2020 | 2007-2009 | 2001 | 1990-1991 | 1981-1982 | 1980 | 1973-1975 | 1969-1970 |
|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------|---------------------------|------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Housing Permits | - | • | × | • | × | × | × | × | × |
| er | Job Sentiment | × | • | × | × | × | × | • | • | • |
| Consumer | Jobless Claims | • | • | • | × | × | × | × | • | × |
| Ö | Retail Sales | - | • | × | × | × | × | × | • | × |
| | Wage Growth | - | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| Business Activity | Commodities | • | • | × | × | × | × | • | • | • |
| | ISM New Orders | • | • | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| | Profit Margins | - | × | × | × | × | × | × | • | × |
| Bus | Truck Shipments | • | • | • | × | × | × | × | n/a | n/a |
| a | Credit Spreads | • | • | × | × | × | × | × | • | • |
| Financial | Money Supply | • | • | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| Ē | Yield Curve | • | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| | Overall Signal | • | | × | × | × | × | × | | × |
| | | ★ Expansion | 1 | Caution | > | Recession | = Not A | Availabl | e | |



Not Available' reflects data that has not been updated due to the government shutdown. Data as of Nov. 30, 2025. Sources: BLS, Federal Reserve, Census Bureau, ISM, BEA, American Chemistry Council, American Trucking Association, Conference Board, Bloomberg, CME, FactSet and Macrobond. The ClearBridge Recession Risk Dashboard was created in January 2016. References to the signals it would have sent in the years prior to January 2016 are based on how the underlying data was reflected in the component indicators at the time.








- ▶ Job creation has been steadily slowing over the past few years, a dynamic that accelerated in 2025 due to changes in trade policy and immigration.
- Economists expect a rebound in job creation into 2026 as stimulus comes online and policy headwinds abate.





Tariff Headwind




► The average effective tariff rate has risen to levels last seen in the 1930s which will likely be a headwind to economic growth in the coming quarters.





Tariff Tailwind?




- ► The Supreme Court may decide that the administration's IEEPA tariffs need to be refunded, which would be a windfall to corporate America next year.
- Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has noted that approximately <u>half</u> of the incremental tariff revenue, which is on pace to near <u>\$200 billion</u> by year-end, has come from IEEPA tariffs.





Tax Tailwind




- ► The OBBB is expected to deliver a positive fiscal boost above and beyond the extension of the 2017 TCJA tax cuts.
- ► The peak impulse of approximately 1% of GDP is estimated to be felt in 2026 before gradually fading over the following three years.





Profits Don't Look Recessionary




- ► Corporate profits have historically plateaued and then declined beginning two quarters prior to past recessions going back to 1965, on average.
- ▶ With profits picking up once again, the recent trajectory bears little resemblance to these past periods, suggesting less of a need for corporations to lay off workers.





The Al Investment Boom




► The U.S. is the leading global destination for AI investment, outpacing the next 10 countries combined by ~2,000 data centers.





The Productivity Pickup



- ► Productivity dropped well below the historical average in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis but has rebounded more recently and is now back in line with the long-term average.
- ▶ While the economy is only beginning to experience benefits from AI, this technology could unleash a sustained productivity wave similar to the internet revolution.





Market Outlook



Not All Cuts Are Equal

| | | | _ | : | S&P 500 Price Chang | e |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|---------|---------------------|----------|
| Initial Cut Date | Economic Outcome | -1Y EPS Growth | +1Y EPS Growth | 6-Month | 12-Month | 24-Month |
| Apr. 1980 | Recession | 12.2% | -3.0% | 22.8% | 33.1% | 9.6% |
| June 1981 | Recession | 0.5% | -5.6% | -4.6% | -15.5% | 22.6% |
| Oct. 1984 | Soft Landing | 22.5% | -9.4% | 10.4% | 11.3% | 41.4% |
| June 1989 | Recession | 16.4% | -15.7% | 7.4% | 12.2% | 21.1% |
| July 1995 | Soft Landing | 33.8% | 20.3% | 11.2% | 21.1% | 59.8% |
| Sept. 1998 | Soft Landing | 3.6% | 5.5% | 18.0% | 25.9% | 44.7% |
| Jan. 2001 | Recession | 11.0% | -16.8% | -9.1% | -14.8% | -34.7% |
| Sept. 2007 | Recession | 10.6% | -8.9% | -12.4% | -15.6% | -32.8% |
| July 2019 | Recession | 9.5% | -12.1% | 8.2% | 9.8% | 47.5% |
| Sept. 2024 | Soft Landing | 6.9% | 10.8% | 6.0% | 15.0% | ??? |
| Recessiona | ry Average | 10.0% | -10.3% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 5.5% |
| Soft Landing Average | | 16.7% | 6.8% | 11.4% | 18.3% | 48.6% |
| | | | | | | |
| Sept. 2025 | ??? | 10.8% | 12.9%* | ??? | ??? | ??? |

- ► Soft landing rate-cut cycles have historically been associated with superior EPS growth and S&P 500 returns.
- ► Sell-side consensus currently expects 12.9% EPS growth over the next 12 months, which if realized would be consistent with past soft-landing cycles.





Equity Leadership Following the Cut

Subsequent 12-Month Price Return

| Initial Rate Cut Economic Outcome | | Cash (3M T-Bills) | Russell 1000 Growth | Russell 1000 Value | Russell Mid Cap | Russell 2000 |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Apr. 1980 | Recession 13.5% 39 | | 39.0% | 30.1% | 51.4% | 66.3% |
| June 1981 | Recession | 15.9% | -18.4% | -15.2% | -18.3% | -20.5% |
| Oct. 1984 | Soft Landing | 8.9% | 9.5% | 10.8% | 12.0% | 8.5% |
| June 1989 | Recession | 8.7% | 17.5% | 4.2% | 4.5% | -1.5% |
| July 1995 | Soft Landing | 5.5% | 22.5% | 18.2% | 17.3% | 19.1% |
| Sept. 1998 | Soft Landing | 4.7% | 30.4% | 12.8% | 13.7% | 13.6% |
| Jan. 2001 | Recession | 4.4% | -15.6% | -5.7% | -3.1% | 5.3% |
| Sept. 2007 | Recession | 3.2% | -17.6% | -25.4% | -19.3% | -12.8% |
| July 2019 | Recession | 1.5% | 24.9% | -9.2% | -0.7% | -5.7% |
| Sept. 2024 | Soft Landing | 4.4% | 26.2% | 8.2% | 10.7% | 9.2% |
| | | | | | | |
| Average | | 7.1% | 11.8% | 2.9% | 6.8% | 8.2% |
| Recessionary Average | | 7.8% | 5.0% | -3.5% | 2.4% | 5.2% |
| Soft Landing Average | | 5.9% | 22.2% | 12.5% | 13.4% | 12.6% |

► Equities have meaningfully outperformed cash following the commencement of soft-landing rate-cut cycles, with large cap growth leading the way.





Cuts Near All-Time Highs a Good Omen




► Equities have historically continued to move higher in the year following historical Fed interest-rate cuts that came with the S&P 500 near All-Time Highs.





Cash on the Sidelines



- ▶ Cash holdings in money market funds have increased dramatically over the past five years.
- Investors may reconsider their asset allocations should the Fed decide to further lower interest rates.





Trouble Concentrating?



▶ The weight of the largest stocks in the benchmark is at record highs.




Data as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: S&P, FactSet, and Bloomberg. **Past performance is not a guarantee of future results**. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. For illustrative purposes only and not reflective of the performance or portfolio composition of any Franklin Templeton fund.



Concentration Leads to Broadening






- ▶ When the top 10 weights in the S&P 500 have historically accounted for over 24% of the benchmark, the equal-weight S&P 500 has outperformed its cap-weighted counterpart by an average of 4.9% (annualized) over the next five years.
- ▶ The top 10 weights in the S&P 500 currently make up 40% of the benchmark.





Where Are They Now: Dot-Com Darlings




- ► Following the peak of the "dot-com" mania, the prospects of the 10 largest S&P 500 constituents have varied widely.
- ▶ We believe that a similar dynamic may play out in the coming years, presenting a potential opportunity for active managers.





Could Low Turnover Turn?




- ► Turnover among the top 25 names has plummeted over the past five years to half the level witnessed during the previous 15.
- ▶ We believe active managers could have a competitive advantage (over passive) in the coming years if mega-cap turnover normalizes to higher levels.



Note: *Top 25 names in the QQD by weight; turnover calculated over a 5-year window. QQQ is an ETF that tracks the Nasdaq 100 Index. Source: FactSet. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. ETFs trade like stocks, fluctuate in market value and may trade above or below the ETF's net asset value. Brokerage commissions and ETF expenses will reduce returns. ETF shares may be bought or sold throughout the day at their market price on the exchange on which they are listed. However, there can be no guarantee that an active trading market for ETF shares will be developed or maintained or that their listing will continue or remain unchanged. While the shares of ETFs are tradable on secondary markets, they may not readily trade in all market conditions and may trade at significant discounts in periods of market stress.



Closing the Gap




- ▶ A key driver of the Magnificent 7 outperformance has been superior earnings growth.
- ▶ Bottom-up consensus expects this advantage to dissipate with broader earnings delivery across U.S. equities in 2026.



The term "consensus" within the capital markets industry refers to the average of earnings estimates made by professionals. Magnificent 7 data refers to the following set of stocks: Microsoft (MSFT), Amazon (AMZN), Meta (META), Apple (AAPL), Google parent Alphabet (G00GL), Nividia (NVDA), and Tesla (TSLA). Data as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: FactSet, S&P. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. There is no assurance that any estimate, forecast or projection will be realized. Company references are used for illustrative purposes and should not be construed as an endorsement of sponsorship of Franklin Templeton companies. This information is not intended as an investment recommendation, nor does it constitute investment advice.



Losing Concentration? Focus on Dividend Growers




- ► Companies that have demonstrated the ability to consistently increase their dividends have historically outperformed the benchmark during periods of stable and falling market concentration.
- ▶ With S&P 500 market concentration at historically elevated levels, we think dividend growers may be well-positioned over the next few years.



*Stable concentration is based on YoY change of +/- 100 bps in combined weight of the ten largest S&P 500 companies, rising + 100 bps or more, falling -100 bps or less. **Dividend Growers are S&P 500 stocks with three consecutive trailing years of positive dividend growth (inclusive of special dividends) on a rolling basis (quarterly), evaluated monthly, equal weighted. Data shown is from Jan. 1994 – Sept. 2025. Sources: Bloomberg, S&P, FactSet. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Dividends may fluctuate and are not guaranteed, and a company may reduce or eliminate its dividend at any time. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.



Don't Be Afraid of All-Time Highs




► Surprisingly, putting money to work at All-Time Highs has historically outperformed deploying capital when the benchmark is below peak, on average.









▶ In the 12 months following an all-time high, stocks have historically been up 8.5% on average with positive returns 71% of the time.





Economic and Market Summary

Fourth Quarter 2025

U.S. Economic Outlook

- The labor market shifted into a lower gear during the third quarter on the back of trade policy uncertainty and reduced immigration, but consensus expectations are for a pickup next year.
- Fiscal and monetary support should provide the foundation for the economy to re-accelerate into 2026.
- The overall signal from the ClearBridge Recession Risk Dashboard remains in green "expansion" territory.

U.S. Market Outlook

- The S&P 500 has continued to march higher with earnings expectations inflecting higher during 3Q.
- Although U.S. equities may need a period of digestion following a robust rally off the April lows, historical rallies of similar magnitude and duration have given way to continued upside over the subsequent 12 months.
- Market leadership has been a tug-of-war in 2025 from a regional and style perspective. We believe this dynamic may continue before giving way to a period of international and value outperformance.

Recession Dashboard Overall Signal





As of Sept. 30, 2025. All opinions and data included in this commentary are as of the publication date and are subject to change. The opinions and views expressed herein are of the author and may differ from other portfolio managers or the firm as a whole and are not intended to be a forecast of future events, a quarantee of future results or investment advice. This information should not be used as the sole basis to make any investment decision.

One-Year Outlook



Themes That May Drive the Market Over the Next 12 Months



Fixed Income



Fundamentals



Market Leadership



Non-U.S.



Investor Pitfalls



Fixed Income





Bond Leadership Following the Cut


| | | Subsequent 12-Month Return | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| Initial Rate Cut | Economic Outcome | Cash (3M T-Bills) | Short-Term Bonds | U.S. Treasury Bonds | Core/Core Plus Bonds | Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds | High Yield Bonds | |
| Apr. 1980 | Recession | 13.5% | 15.1% | 13.1% | 13.0% | 13.2% | - | |
| June 1981 | Recession | 15.9% | 16.9% | 15.2% | 14.9% | 14.6% | - | |
| Oct. 1984 | Soft Landing | 8.9% | 16.4% | 20.6% | 22.0% | 23.8% | 22.7% | |
| June 1989 | Recession | 8.7% | 9.3% | 8.7% | 9.4% | 9.2% | -2.6% | |
| July 1995 | Soft Landing | 5.5% | 5.5% | 2.8% | 3.3% | 3.0% | 9.7% | |
| Sept. 1998 | Soft Landing | 4.7% | 3.6% | -1.1% | 0.3% | -0.6% | 3.5% | |
| Jan. 2001 | Recession | 4.4% | 8.0% | 4.9% | 7.0% | 8.8% | 5.1% | |
| Sept. 2007 | Recession | 3.2% | 5.9% | 10.6% | 6.0% | -1.7% | -4.7% | |
| July 2019 | Recession | 1.5% | 4.4% | 12.0% | 10.2% | 12.6% | 4.0% | |
| Sept. 2024 | Soft Landing | 4.4% | 4.2% | 1.7% | 2.6% | 3.5% | 7.9% | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | 7.1% | 8.9% | 8.9% | 8.9% | 8.6% | 5.7% | |
| Recessiona | ary Average | 7.8% | 9.9% | 10.8% | 10.1% | 9.5% | 0.5% | |
| Soft Landir | ng Average | 5.9% | 7.4% | 6.0% | 7.1% | 7.4% | 11.0% | |

► Following historical soft-landing cutting cycles, investors have been rewarded by taking on credit risk whereas Treasuries have fared best during recessions.

Note: rate-cut cycles of at least 75 bps. Short-Term Bonds represented by the Bloomberg 1-3 Yr US Gov/Credit Total Return Index, U.S. Treasury Bonds represented by the Bloomberg US Treasury Total Return Unhedged USD, Core/Core Plus Bonds represented by the Bloomberg US Agg Total Return Value Unhedged Index, Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds represented by the Bloomberg US Corporate Total Return Value Unhedged USD Index. Sources: FactSet, Bloomberg, ICE, NBER. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. For illustrative purposes only and not reflective of the performance or portfolio composition of any Franklin Templeton fund.




Fed Cuts, Now What?



- ▶ Long bond yields typically drop ahead of an initial Fed cut, with soft-landing cycles seeing larger declines.
- Once a cutting cycle is under way, 10-year yields tend to stabilize as soft landings play out, but continue to drop during recessions.




Interest Rate Impact by Asset Class



^{*}Total return, assumes a parallel shift in the yield curve. Data as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: Bloomberg, ICE, Credit Suisse, S&P, Morningstar Direct. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.



Recent Yields Offer Attractive Return Potential




► Following the strongest tightening cycle in 40 years, bond yields have risen to levels that have historically offered attractive five-year returns.

*Returns represent the average five-year annualized return between Jan. 29, 1999 and Sept. 30, 2025 when the current yield was within 50 bps on Sept. 30, 2025 for each fixed income sector. Short-Term Bonds: Bloomberg 1-3 Yr US Gov/Credit Total Return Index, Leverage Loans: Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Total Return, Corporate Bonds: US Corporate Total Return Value Unhedged IDD, High Yield Bonds: Bloomberg US Corporate High-Yield Total Return Index Value Unhedged USD Index, MBS: Bloomberg US MBS Index Total Return Value Unhedged USD, Global Bonds: Bloomberg Global-Aggregate Total Return Index Value Unhedged USD, Multi-Sector Bonds: Bloomberg Multiverse Total Return Index Value Unhedged USD Index, Emerging Market Bonds: Bloomberg EM USD Aggregate Total Return Index Value Unhedged, TIPS: Bloomberg US Treasury Inflation Notes TR Index Value Unhedged USD. As of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. For illustrative purposes only and not reflective of the performance or portfolio composition of any Franklin Templeton fund.



One Less Brick In The Wall

High Yield Debt Maturity Schedule*




► Companies with sub-investment-grade ratings have taken advantage of ample liquidity in recent years and termed out their debt, meaningfully reducing rollover risk.

^{*}The chart represents the amount of high-yield debt maturing as a percent of total outstanding high-yield debt by calendar year for the ICE BofA ML U.S. High Yield Index. Maturities shown are from 2025 through 2034+. As of Aug. 31, 2025, latest available as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: ICE, Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research. Due to rounding, figures may not total 100%. Past performance is not a quarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.




Munis Attractive After Tax



▶ With the recent rise in interest rates, high-quality municipal bonds now offer attractive yields on an after-tax basis compared with U.S. Treasuries.




Emerging Markets: A Dual Threat



- Consensus estimates call for emerging markets to see strong GDP growth in 2025.
- ► Emerging markets also currently boast the highest yields globally, a potentially attractive combination for long-term investors.




When Will U.S. Debt Be An Issue?



- Despite a dramatic increase in government debt outstanding since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), total debt servicing costs as a percent of GDP declined due to falling rates.
- ► Current CBO projections show the interest burden returning to early 1990s levels over the next couple of years.




Debt Doesn't Determine Yield



► Contrary to popular belief, higher government debt loads do not translate to higher yields on long-term government debt.



U.S. Dollar (Still) Dominates



▶ The greenback remains firmly entrenched as the world's reserve currency despite recent concerns.




Fundamentals



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Home Equity Boom



- Homeowner wealth has improved dramatically over the past decade, with accumulated equity surpassing \$35 trillion.
- With collective mortgage liabilities totaling just \$13.5 trillion, consumers appear to have ample room to tap Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOC) as source of funds.





Largest Stocks Distorting Valuations




► The largest stocks in the S&P 500 trade at a significant premium to the rest of the benchmark (other 490).





EPS Revisions Resilient




- ► Earnings estimates typically fall coming into the year and drift lower as rosy forecasts meet a harsher reality.
- ▶ Expectations for 2025 have turned higher, providing support to the market rally.





Consumer Confidence: The Contra-Indicator




- ► Consumer sentiment has historically been a contra-indicator for equity investors when hitting extreme levels.
- ▶ If this historical relationship holds, the May lows may be consistent with an attractive entry point for long-term equity investors.





What's Driving Inflation



- ► Core goods inflation has been moving higher over the past year and is likely to continue rising given the shift in U.S. trade policy.
- ▶ While overall inflation is likely to rise, continued normalization in shelter and services ex-rents prices should help keep the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) from running away to the upside.






Market Leadership





Value, Down But Not Out






► Value has historically recovered following periods of sizeable (-25%) underperformance vs. Growth. This threshold was triggered during 1Q25.



Russell 1000 Growth, Russell 1000 Value, reflective of period from 1979 – present, as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: FactSet, Russell. **Past performance** is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.



Value Not Yet Expensive




▶ Value vs. Growth leadership and valuation have been in a tug-of-war over the past several years, with Growth recently regaining the upper hand.





The Value Proposition




► Value has historically outperformed Growth by a healthy margin when the valuation gap (P/E differential) is above 10x. The valuation gap is currently 13.8x.





S&P 500 Technology Sector Profitability and Valuation




- ► Although valuations for Al beneficiaries have expanded rapidly, the technology sector remains well below the levels seen at the height of the dot-com bubble.
- Importantly, companies today are more profitable (higher ROEs), which we believe may provide a buffer against future disappointments.









► Small- and mid-cap (SMID) stocks have historically recovered following periods of sizeable (-15%) underperformance vs. large-cap stocks. This threshold was triggered during 2H24.





SMID Caps on Sale



- ▶ Small- and mid-cap stocks have historically traded at similar multiples to large.
- ▶ With large caps leading since the pandemic, the valuation discount for small and mid is near the widest in over two decades.





Non-U.S.





Home-Country Bias


Investors Tend to Over-Allocate to Their Home Country







Global Leadership Cycles



- ▶ History shows the geographic leadership tends to persist for longer than investors appreciate.
- ► The United States has been in the driver's seat since the Global Financial Crisis, although a turning point may be near.



Note: Price Return. Data shows rolling five-year annualized performance differential between S&P 500 and MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. indices. Data as of Sept. 30, 2025. Sources: Macrobond, S&P, MSCI. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.



Leadership Rarely Persists

1980 2000 1990 2010 2020 IBM Exxon Microsoft Apple NTT AT&T Bank of Tokyo Microsoft PetroChina Industrial Exxon NTT Docomo Apple Alphabet Bank of Japan Standard Oil **BHP Billiton** Sumitomi Mitsui Cisco Amazon Schlumberger Toyota Walmart Microsoft Facebook Shell Oil Fuji Bank Intel **ICBC** Alibaba Dai-Ichi Berkshire Mobil NTT Petrobras Kangyo Bank Hathaway China Construct. Eastman Kodak IBM Exxon Tencent Bank Royal Atlantic Richfield **JPMorgan UFJ Bank** Lucent **Dutch Shell** Deutsche Visa Exxon Nestle Telecom


Top 10 Companies by Market Value at Decade End

- The largest companies in the world have rarely held onto their leadership position for prolonged periods in the past.
- ▶ With U.S. companies currently dominating the list, history suggests the potential for a stronger international showing in the coming decade.





Diversification Matters



▶ Although the U.S. has outperformed international equities historically, investors have been rewarded for holding non-U.S. stocks during periods of softer U.S. performance.





International Equity Leadership Following the Cut

Subsequent 12-Month Price Return

| | | | Subsequent 12 Month Free Return | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--|
| Initial Rate Cut | Economic Outcome | MSCI EAFE | MSCI EAFE Growth | MSCI EAFE Value | MSCI Emerging Markets | |
| Apr. 1980 | Recession | 32.5% | 32.4% | 32.5% | | |
| June 1981 | Recession -7. | | -11.0% | -4.2% | | |
| Oct. 1984 | Soft Landing | 40.7% | 41.5% | 40.6% | | |
| June 1989 | Recession | 2.4% | -0.3% | 5.5% | 22.3% | |
| July 1995 | Soft Landing | 13.3% | 11.6% | 15.4% | 5.4% | |
| Sept. 1998 | Soft Landing | 25.7% | 20.3% | 30.7% | 51.4% | |
| Jan. 2001 | Recession | -21.2% | -24.2% | -18.4% | -1.2% | |
| Sept. 2007 | Recession | -24.0% | -20.3% | -27.6% | -28.4% | |
| July 2019 | Recession | -0.4% | 10.5% | -11.1% | 6.2% | |
| Sept. 2024 | Soft Landing | 17.6% | 10.7% | 24.7% | 26.2% | |
| | | | | | | |
| Average | | 8.0% | 7.1% | 8.8% | 11.7% | |
| Recessionary Average | | -2.9% | -2.2% | -3.9% | -0.3% | |
| Soft Landing Average | | 24.3% | 21.0% | 27.9% | 27.6% | |

► Non-U.S. equities typically surge following the commencement of past soft-landing Fed rate-cut cycles.





Global Valuations Attractive




▶ International equities remain cheap relative to U.S. stocks even after outperforming in 1H25.





U.S. Dollar Cycle




▶ U.S. dollar cycles have historically lasted ~16 years with a potential inflection point having been reached in 2022.





Regional Leadership Tethered To The Dollar




- ► History shows that geographic leadership is more closely tied to currency moves than investors appreciate.
- ▶ Recent dollar weakness suggests a turning point may be near.





Weaker Dollar Supercharges Non-U.S. Stocks



International equities have tended to outperform during periods of dollar weakness.





Investor Pitfalls





Panic Attacks and the S&P 500

| Year | Panic Attacks | S&P 500 Max Drawdown | Cumulative S&P 500 Price Return* |
|------|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1999 | Y2K | -12.1% | 378.5% |
| 2000 | Tech Bubble Bursts | -17.2% | 300.3% |
| 2001 | September 11th, 2001 Recession | -29.7% | 345.5% |
| 2002 | Final Tech Bubble Flush, Corporate Scandals (Worldcom) | -33.8% | 412.3% |
| 2003 | Iraq War | -14.1% | 568.5% |
| 2004 | Oil Price Breakout | -8.2% | 429.0% |
| 2005 | Hurricane Katrina | -7.2% | 385.3% |
| 2006 | Fed Culminates Hiking Cycle | -7.7% | 371.2% |
| 2007 | Subprime Cracks Emerge | -10.1% | 314.7% |
| 2008 | Global Financial Crisis, Bank Failures, Auto Bailouts | -48.8% | 300.6% |
| 2009 | Global Financial Crisis Culminates | -27.6% | 551.2% |
| 2010 | European Debt Crisis, Flash Crash | -16.0% | 427.5% |
| 2011 | S&P Downgrades U.S. Debt, Greek Debt Writedowns | -19.4% | 367.7% |
| 2012 | Euro Crisis, 2nd Greek Bailout | -9.9% | 367.7% |
| 2013 | Taper Tantrum | -5.8% | 312.4% |
| 2014 | Ebola | -7.4% | 218.2% |
| 2015 | Chinese Slowdown, Yuan Devaluation, Deflation Scare | -12.4% | 185.7% |
| 2016 | Brexit, Global Negative Rates | -10.5% | 187.8% |
| 2017 | North Korea Tensions Escalate | -2.8% | 162.7% |
| 2018 | Trade Wars, Short Vol Unwind | -19.8% | 120.0% |
| 2019 | Repo Crisis, Yield Curve Inversion | -6.8% | 134.6% |
| 2020 | COVID-19 Pandemic | -33.9% | 82.0% |
| 2021 | COVID Variants, Chinese Regulatory Crackdown | -5.2% | 56.6% |
| 2022 | Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Fed's Hawkish Pivot | -25.4% | 23.4% |
| 2023 | Regional Bank Crisis, Debt Ceiling Drama | -10.3% | 53.2% |
| 2024 | Inflation Scare, Sahm Rule Triggered | -8.5% | 23.3% |



*Cumulative S&P 500 price return is calculated from day prior to the new year (ex. 1999 looks at Dec. 31, 1998) to present. Data as of Dec. 31, 2024. Sources: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve, S&P. **Past performance is not a guarantee of future results**. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.



Don't Fall Victim to Panic Attacks

20 Years Annualized Returns (2004-2023)






Source: Bloomberg, Dec. 31, 2023. Average asset allocation investor return is based on an analysis by DALBAR, Inc., which utilizes the net of aggregate mutual fund sales, redemptions and exchanges each month as a measure of investor behavior. Indices shown are as follows: REITs are represented by the NAREIT Equity REIT Index, U.S. Stocks are represented by the S&P 500 Index, International Equities are represented by the MSCI EAFE Index, Government-Related Bonds are represented by the Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Index, Homes are represented by U.S. existing home sales median price, Inflation is represented by the Consumer Price Index. Indices are unmanaged and cannot be purchased directly by investors. Index performance is shown for illustrative purposes only and does not predict or depict the performance of any investment. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.




Volatility Not a Financial Loss Unless You Sell












► Since 1945, an investor that consistently sold 12 months prior to a market peak and bought back 12 months after the trough was worse off overall than a buy-and-hold investor.



FRANKLIN TEMPLETON

"It's the Economy..."




- ► Historically, the U.S. equity market has performed well under both Democratic and Republican administrations.
- ► The only two presidents who witnessed negative stock market performance during their terms had the misfortune of being bookended by recessions.





Don't Mix Politics and Investing




▶ Historically, the equity market has moved higher irrespective of which party occupies the Oval Office.





Market Annual Returns

Distribution of S&P 500 Total Returns Since 1928







Biographies

The Anatomy of a Recession

| Name and Position | | Industry Experience | ClearBridge Tenure | Education, Experience and Professional Designations | |
|-------------------|--|------------------------|----------------------------|---|--|
| | Josh Jamner CFA Director, Senior Investment Strategy Analyst | 16 years | Joined ClearBridge in 2017 | Member of the CFA Institute RBC Capital Markets - Assistant Vice President, Associate Strategist - U.S. Equity Bessemer Trust - Assistant Vice President, Client Portfolio Analyst BA in Government from Colby College | |
| O | Jeffrey Schulze CFA Managing Director, Head of Economic and Market Strategy | 20 years | Joined ClearBridge in 2014 | Member of the CFA Institute Lord Abbett & Co., LLC – Portfolio Specialist BS in Finance from Rutgers University | |



What Are the Risks



Equity securities are subject to price fluctuation and possible loss of principal. **Small- and mid-cap** stocks involve greater risks and volatility than large-cap stocks. **Large-capitalization** companies may fall out of favor with investors based on market and economic conditions. **Active management** does not ensure gains or protect against market declines. **Diversification** does not guarantee a profit or protect against a loss.

Fixed income securities involve interest rate, credit, inflation and reinvestment risks, and possible loss of principal. As interest rates rise, the value of fixed income securities falls. Low-rated, high-yield bonds are subject to greater price volatility, illiquidity and possibility of default. **Floating-rate loans** and debt securities are typically rated below investment grade and are subject to greater risk of default, which could result in loss of principal.

International investments are subject to special risks, including currency fluctuations and social, economic and political uncertainties, which could increase volatility. These risks are magnified in **emerging markets**.





Glossary of Terms

BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index: an unmanaged index of U.S. investment-grade fixed-income securities.

Bloomberg US Corporate Investment Grade Bond Index: an unmanaged index of U.S. investment-grade corporate bond securities.

Bloomberg Global Aggregate Total Return Index: measure of global investment grade debt from a multitude of local currency markets. This multi-currency benchmark includes treasury, government-related, corporate and securitized fixed-rate bonds from both developed and emerging markets issuers.

CPI (Consumer Price Index): measure of the average change in U.S. consumer prices over time in a fixed market basket of goods and services as determined by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

EPS (Earnings per Share): the portion of a company's profit allocated to each outstanding share of common stock.

Fed (Federal Reserve Board): the U.S. central bank, responsible for policies designed to promote full economic growth, full employment, and price stability.

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GFC (Global Financial Crisis): the severe economic and market downturn experienced in 2007-2008.

Hit Rate: Metric that measures the percentage of successful outcomes relative to the total number of opportunities.

Home Sales Median Price: measures the price at which half of existing homes sold for more and half sold for less.

MSCI All Country Asia Index: unmanaged index of large and mid cap stocks across Developed Markets countries and Emerging Markets countries in Asia.

MSCI EM Index: unmanaged index of large- and mid-cap stocks in 27 emerging market countries.

MSCI Europe Index: unmanaged index of largeand mid-cap stocks across 15 Developed Markets (DM) countries in Europe.

MSCI EAFE Index: unmanaged index of equity securities from developed countries in Western Europe, the Far East, and Australasia.

MSCI Germany Index: unmanaged index of large- and mid-cap stocks across the German market.

MSCI Japan Index: unmanaged index of largeand mid-cap stocks across the Japanese market.

MSCI UK Index: unmanaged index of large- and mid-cap stocks across the UK market.

MSCI USA Index: unmanaged index of US largeand mid-cap equity securities.

NAREIT All-Equity REITS Total Return Index: free-float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that includes all tax qualified REITS listed in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ National Markets.

NFIB (National Federation of Independent Business): a U.S. small business advocacy association, representing over 350,000 small and independent business owners.

NFIB Small Business Optimism Index: measure of small business sentiment produced by the National Federation of Independent Business based on its monthly survey of small business owners.

P/E Ratio: Price/Earnings ratio

PMI: Purchasing Manager's Index





Glossary of Terms (continued)

Russell 1000 Index: a subset of the Russell 3000 Index that includes approximately 1,000 of the largest companies in the U.S. equity universe.

Russell 1000 Growth Index: unmanaged index of large-cap stocks chosen for their growth orientation.

Russell 1000 Value Index: unmanaged index of large-cap stocks chosen for their value orientation.

Russell 2000 Index: unmanaged index of small-cap stocks.

Russell 2000 Growth Index: unmanaged index of small-cap stocks chosen for their growth orientation.

Russell 2000 Value Index: unmanaged index of small-cap stocks chosen for their value orientation.

Russell Mid Cap Index: unmanaged index consisting of the 800 smallest companies in the Russell 1000 Index.

Russell Mid Cap Growth Index: unmanaged index of mid-capitalization U.S. equities that exhibit growth characteristics.

Russell Mid Cap Value Index: unmanaged index of mid-capitalization U.S. equities that exhibit value characteristics.

Sahm Rule: The Sahm Rule identifies signals related to the start of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment rate (U3) rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to its low during the previous 12 months.

S&P MidCap 400 Index: unmanaged index of 400 US mid-cap stocks.

S&P 400 Growth Index: unmanaged index of mid-cap stocks having higher price-to-book ratios relative to the S&P 400 MidCap as a whole.

S&P 400 Value Index: unmanaged index of mid-cap stocks having lower price-to-book ratios relative to the S&P 400 MidCap as a whole.

S&P 500 Growth Index: unmanaged index of large-cap stocks selected based on sales growth, the ratio of earnings change to price and momentum.

S&P 500 Value Index: unmanaged index of large-cap stocks selected based on the ratios of book value, earnings, and sales to price.

S&P 600 Index: unmanaged index of 600 US small-cap stocks

S&P 600 Growth Index: unmanaged index of US small-cap growth stocks, selected based on sales growth, the ratio of earnings change to price, and momentum.

S&P 600 Value Index: unmanaged index of US small-cap value stocks, selected based on ratios of book value, earnings, and sales to price.

S&P 500 Index: Unmanaged index of 500 stocks that is generally representative of the performance of larger companies in the U.S.

Yield Curve: Comparison of interest rates at a point in time of bonds with equal credit quality but different maturity dates.

YoY: Year Over Year

U.S. Treasurys: Direct debt obligations issued and backed by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government. The U.S. government guarantees the principal and interest payments on U.S. Treasuries when the securities are held to maturity. Unlike U.S. Treasury securities, debt securities issued by the federal agencies and instrumentalities and related investments may or may not be backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. Even when the U.S. government guarantees principal and interest payments on securities, this guarantee does not apply to losses resulting from declines in the market value of these securities.





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