

This edition of Global Macro Shifts examines US corporate tax reform and the potential impacts of a border adjustment tax (BAT). We review how a BAT would work, its likely effect on prices and exchange rates, its implications for the longer-term macroeconomic outlook, its impact on different domestic sectors and trade flows, and the potential ramifications for international trade relations.

This document is a summary version of the full research-based briefing, which can be found in its entirety at the <u>Global Macro Shifts homepage</u>.

#### IMPORTANT INFORMATION

This material reflects the analysis and opinions of the authors as of April 19, 2017, and may differ from the opinions of other portfolio managers, investment teams or platforms at Franklin Templeton Investments. It is intended to be of general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax advice.

The views expressed and the comments, opinions and analyses are rendered as of the publication date and may change without notice. The information provided in this material is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding any country, region or market, industry or strategy.

All investments involve risks, including possible loss of principal. Special risks are associated with foreign investing, including currency fluctuations, economic instability and political developments. Investments in emerging markets, of which frontier markets are a subset, involve heightened risks related to the same factors, in addition to those associated with these markets' smaller size, lesser liquidity and lack of established legal, political, business and social frameworks to support securities markets. Because these frameworks are typically even less developed in frontier markets, as well as various factors including the increased potential for extreme price volatility, illiquidity, trade barriers and exchange controls, the risks associated with emerging markets are magnified in frontier markets. Bond prices generally move in the opposite direction of interest rates. Thus, as prices of bonds in an investment portfolio adjust to a rise in interest rates, the value of the portfolio may decline.

Global Macro Shifts is a research-based briefing on global economies featuring the analysis and views of Dr. Michael Hasenstab and senior members of Templeton Global Macro.

### **Overview**



"Implementing a BAT would likely bolster the competitiveness of US firms, eliminate the existing incentive to keep profits offshore, and raise the revenue needed to fund a substantial cut in the statutory corporate income tax rate."

Michael Hasenstab, CIO Templeton Global Macro

The new US administration's two central economic goals are promoting growth and reviving domestic manufacturing. While there are many different aspects to the reform agenda, a lot of controversy has centered on the corporate tax reform plan favored by the House GOP, which aims at linking both of these objectives from the administration. It would, in theory, promote growth by lowering the corporate tax rate, and encourage domestic manufacturing by discouraging imports.

While there is little debate on the need to reduce the statutory corporate income tax rate, the introduction of an import-targeted "border adjustment" (BAT) to it, has been far more divisive. We would note that eventually some form of a BAT could come with a different name tag such as a "reciprocal tax." Because a BAT would generate considerable revenues, it would help pay for substantially lower statutory rates, paving the way for an ambitious tax reform. Clearly, given its impact on exports and imports, the

BAT could also have potentially broad implications for trade. Assuming that trade tensions would be kept under control, the greatest impact would likely come from the improvement in the business environment, which should spur investment and result in faster productivity growth and accelerating economic activity.

### **How the BAT Would Work**

In the new corporate income tax envisaged in the GOP reform blueprint, the border adjustment would work as follows:

- Revenues from exports would be exempt from the taxable base for corporate tax.
- The cost of domestic inputs would be subtracted from the tax base, but the cost of imported inputs would not.

Overall, the reform would shift from a worldwide system to a territorial system, based on where consumption occurs rather than where production takes place; from a system that allows interest deduction to one that largely ignores financial flows; and from a tax on income toward a tax on consumption.

While border adjustment would be a new feature for the US tax system, most other countries already have it in the form of a value added tax (VAT), a consumption tax that has a border adjustability component. In terms of its economic impact, the BAT would be equivalent to adopting a VAT while eliminating payroll taxes.

# Reasons Why the BAT Is Controversial

- Politically contentious: All tax reforms create winners and losers, but the border adjustment aspect raises the stakes for exporting and importing sectors (as illustrated by heavy lobbying efforts).
- Uncertain economic implications: The
  economic adjustment could potentially be
  disruptive to prices, profits, supply chains,
  trade flows and exchange rates. We would
  note, however, that all other advanced
  economies already have survived the
  imposition of border-adjusted
  consumption taxes (VATs), and have
  adjusted.
- WTO compliance: The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently allows border adjustment for indirect taxes but not for direct taxes. The border-adjusted corporate income tax would therefore seem to be in violation of WTO rules; this could trigger complaints and retaliatory measures. However, as we noted above, the GOP proposal would be exactly equivalent to a VAT—which the WTO allows—plus the elimination of the payroll tax, a purely domestic tax decision that the WTO would have no jurisdiction over. WTO objections would therefore seem to have no defensible economic basis.

## Impact on Exchange Rates and Prices

Economic theory tells us that a borderadjusted tax, such as a VAT, should have no long-term impact on trade flows. The trade balance by definition equals a country's savings-investment balance. While a VAT, as a tax on consumption, would encourage savings, it would also encourage investment. The same argument applies to the BAT proposal. In theory, over the long term the net impact on the savings-investment balance will be neutral, and the exchange rate will appreciate so as to offset the extent to which the BAT would make imports less competitive (and exports more competitive). Over the long run, the US dollar (USD) exchange rate should appreciate to offset the competitiveness impact of the tax. In the short and medium

term, however, the adjustment would likely be only partial; this partial exchange rate adjustment would result in an increase in the price of imported goods, with a temporary boost to inflation that we estimate could be around one percentage point.

## Impact on Domestic Sectors and Trade Flows

Following the immediate price response, domestic production and trade patterns will adjust as firms respond to the new tax and competitive environment. While the benefit from a lower corporate statutory rate would be broadly shared, the BAT would have a differential impact across industries and sectors:


- Profits of US importers would be squeezed, while some exporters and import-competing firms would benefit.
- Foreign competitors would likely reduce pre-tax prices and accept somewhat lower profits in order to maintain their share in the US market.
- There would likely be some immediate disruption to supply chains (especially with multi-border crossings)—US companies would try to substitute domestic for imported inputs where possible.
- The valuation impact on US dollar and foreign-denominated assets would hurt Americans with foreign assets or foreigners with dollar-denominated debt.

The actual impact on a firm's bottom line will depend on many factors and will vary greatly within sectors. Exhibit 1 plots the net tax reduction as a share of industry gross output against the industry size for context, assuming a 20% BAT together with a 15%

corporate tax reduction.1 In our analysis, the relatively small product categories of apparel, leather and allied products and textile mills and textile product mills are the big losers. Additionally, motor vehicles and parts dealers as well as computer and electronic products—both much larger product categories—are among the notable losers in terms of the immediate impact of the reform.2 On the other hand, sectors such as other transportation equipment (including aircraft) and chemicals would benefit. In other cases, the story is more nuanced: For example, oil and gas extraction firms benefit, while the producers of petroleum and coal products lose, echoing the tension between refiners and oil shale producers.

#### Potential Sectoral Winners and Losers

Exhibit 1: Estimated Impact on Goods-Producing Industries (20% BAT and 15% Corporate Tax Cut)
As of 2015



Source: Calculations by Templeton Global Macro using data sourced from US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The blue diamonds in Exhibit 1 represent around 25 different goods-producing industries as categorized by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We labeled nine specific industries in this exhibit that we found important to our analysis. We left the other 16 industries unlabeled due to space constraints but kept them marked in the chart to show where most industries fall on the value-added spectrum. The y-axis is essentially a measure of how significant an industry is (value added) and the x-axis is essentially a measure of whether the industry would be a winner or loser from BAT and corporate tax cuts. Industries that are higher on the y-axis (e.g., construction) are essentially more significant (value added). Industries to the right of the 0% mark on the x-axis (e.g., oil and gas, chemicals, other transport equipment) would potentially benefit from BAT policy, while industries to the left of that mark (apparel, textiles, motor vehicles) could be negatively impacted.

## The Longer-Term Macro Impact

As a momentous change in the US tax system, the tax reform would have an important longer-term macro impact. The overall fiscal reform has several positive attributes that would potentially improve the business environment, boosting productivity, competitiveness and growth:

- Lower taxes: An ambitious tax reform would see a significant reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate. Personal income taxes may also be cut.
- Greater efficiency: As important, a successful reform would simplify and improve the efficiency of the US tax system—often perceived as highly complex and wasteful.
- Repatriation: A territorial system would diminish the incentives to keep profits overseas. A one-time low tax rate is likely to induce the return of untaxed accumulated profits held abroad, which could lift domestic activity. It has also been suggested that the tax liability on repatriated profits could potentially be offset by tax credits designed to incentivize investment in infrastructure projects.

While the US economy already stands poised for a cyclical recovery in investment, a successful corporate tax reform would go a long way in promoting the incentives for real investment over the long term. Since weak investment has been identified as a potential drag on productivity growth since the global financial crisis, this shift in incentives could have strong and long-lived benefits.

- 1. Of course, the actual net gain or loss across all sectors will depend on whether the GOP's tax reform ends up being revenue neutral.
- 2. In a few sectors, such as apparel and autos, the estimated increase in tax liability (even after including corporate tax cuts) would represent a sizable fraction of overall profits.

### **Conclusion**

Implementing a BAT would bolster the competitiveness of US firms, eliminate the existing incentive to keep profits offshore, and raise the revenue needed to fund a substantial cut in the statutory corporate income tax rate (currently the highest in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD]). In addition, it would be equivalent to adopting a VAT, which most US trading partners already have—it would level the playing field. Trading partners, however, would likely

appeal to the WTO and might launch retaliatory measures—though we believe the risk of all-out trade wars is limited.

We expect that the USD would appreciate, but not enough to fully offset the impact of the BAT on the competitiveness of imports and exports. As a consequence, higher import prices would impart a temporary boost to inflation, which we estimate to be about one percentage point; some US import-competing firms would have the

chance to gain market share through import substitution, though the extent to which they succeed would also depend on investment and productivity gains; exporters would benefit, while importers, including large retailers and refineries, would suffer. However, assuming that trade tensions would be kept under control, we believe the policy adjustment would improve the overall business environment, drive investment, and accelerate economic activity.



Michael Hasenstab, Ph.D.

Executive Vice President, Portfolio Manager,
Chief Investment Officer
Templeton Global Macro

### **About Global Macro Shifts**

Global Macro Shifts is a research-based briefing on global economies featuring the analysis and views of Dr. Michael Hasenstab and senior members of Templeton Global Macro. Dr. Hasenstab and his team manage Templeton's global bond strategies, including unconstrained fixed income, currency and global macro. This economic team, trained in some of the leading universities in the world, integrates global macroeconomic analysis with in-depth country research to help identify long-term imbalances that translate to investment opportunities.



Sonal Desai, Ph.D. Senior Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Director of Research Templeton Global Macro



Calvin Ho, Ph.D. Vice President, Senior Global Macro & Research Analyst Templeton Global Macro



Hyung C. Shin, Ph.D. Vice President, Senior Global Macro & Research Analyst Templeton Global Macro



Diego Valderrama, Ph.D. Senior Global Macro & Research Analyst Templeton Global Macro



Attila Korpos, Ph.D. Research Analyst Templeton Global Macro



**Shlomi Kramer, Ph.D.** Research Analyst Templeton Global Macro

#### IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

This material reflects the analysis and opinions of the authors as of April 19, 2017, and may differ from the opinions of other portfolio managers, investment teams or platforms at Franklin Templeton Investments. It is intended to be of general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax advice.

The views expressed and the comments, opinions and analyses are rendered as of the publication date and may change without notice. The information provided in this material is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding any country, region or market, industry or strategy.

Data from third party sources may have been used in the preparation of this material and Franklin Templeton Investments ("FTI") has not independently verified, validated or audited such data. FTI accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss arising from use of this information and reliance upon the comments opinions and analyses in the material is at the sole discretion of the user.

Products, services and information may not be available in all jurisdictions and are offered outside the U.S. by other FTI affiliates and/or their distributors as local laws and regulation permits. Please consult your own professional adviser for further information on availability of products and services in your jurisdiction.

<u>Issued in the U.S.</u> by Franklin Templeton Distributors, Inc., One Franklin Parkway, San Mateo, California 94403-1906, (800) DIAL BEN/342-5236, franklintempleton.com - Franklin Templeton Distributors, Inc. is the principal distributor of Franklin Templeton Investments' U.S. registered products, which are available only in jurisdictions where an offer or solicitation of such products is permitted under applicable laws and regulation.

Australia: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments Australia Limited (ABN 87 006 972 247) (Australian Financial Services License Holder No. 225328), Level 19, 101 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3000. Austria/Germany: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Services GmbH, Mainzer Landstraße 16, D-60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Authorized in Germany by IHK Frankfurt M., Reg. no. D-F-125-TMX1-08. Canada: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments Corp., 5000 Yonge Street, Suite 900 Toronto, ON, M2N 0A7, Fax: (416) 364-1163, (800) 387-0830, www.franklintempleton.ca. Dubai: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments (ME) Limited, authorized and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Dubai office: Franklin Templeton Investments, The Gate, East Wing, Level 2, Dubai International Financial Centre, P.O. Box 506613, Dubai, U.A.E., Tel.: +9714-4284100 Fax:+9714-4284140. France: Issued by Franklin Templeton France S.A., 20 rue de la Paix, 75002 Paris, France. Hong Kong: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments (Asia) Limited, 17/F, Chater House, 8 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong. Italy: Issued by Franklin Templeton International Services S.à.r.I. - Italian Branch, Corso Italia, 1 - Milan, 20122, Italy. Japan: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments Japan Limited. Korea: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Trust Management Co., Ltd., 3rd fl., CCMM Building, 12 Youido-Dong, Youngdungpo-Gu, Seoul, Korea 150-968. Luxembourg/Benelux: Issued by Franklin Templeton International Services S.à r.l. - Supervised by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier - 8A, rue Albert Borschette, L-1246 Luxembourg - Tel: +352-46 66 67-1 - Fax: +352-46 66 76. Malaysia: Issued by Franklin Templeton Asset Management (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. & Franklin Templeton GSC Asset Management Sdn. Bhd. Poland: Issued by Templeton Asset Management (Poland) TFI S.A., Rondo ONZ 1; 00-124 Warsaw. Romania: Issued by the Bucharest branch of Franklin Templeton Investment Management Limited, 78-80 Buzesti Street, Premium Point, 7th-8th Floor, 011017 Bucharest 1, Romania. Registered with Romania Financial Supervisory Authority under no. PJM01SFIM/400005/14.09.2009, authorized and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority. Singapore: Issued by Templeton Asset Management Ltd. Registration No. (UEN) 199205211E. 7 Temasek Boulevard, #38-03 Suntec Tower One, 038987, Singapore. Spain: Issued by the branch of Franklin Templeton Investment Management, Professional of the Financial Sector under the Supervision of CNMV, José Ortega y Gasset 29, Madrid. South Africa: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments SA (PTY) Ltd which is an authorised Financial Services Provider. Tel: +27 (21) 831 7400 Fax: +27 (21) 831 7422. Switzerland: Issued by Franklin Templeton Switzerland Ltd, Stockerstrasse 38, CH-8002 Zurich. UK: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Management Limited (FTIML), registered office: Cannon Place, 78 Cannon Street, London EC4N 6HL. Authorized and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Conduct Authority. Nordic regions: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Management Limited (FTIML), Swedish Branch, Blasieholmsgatan 5, SE-111 48 Stockholm, Sweden. Phone: +46 (0) 8 545 01230, Fax: +46 (0) 8 545 01239. FTIML is authorised and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Conduct Authority and is authorized to conduct certain investment services in Denmark, in Sweden, in Norway and in Finland. Offshore Americas: In the U.S., this publication is made available only to financial intermediaries by Templeton/Franklin Investment Services, 100 Fountain Parkway, St. Petersburg, Florida 33716. Tel: (800) 239-3894 (USA Toll-Free), (877) 389-0076 (Canada Toll-Free), and Fax: (727) 299-8736. Investments are not FDIC insured; may lose value; and are not bank guaranteed. Distribution outside the U.S. may be made by Templeton Global Advisors Limited or other sub-distributors, intermediaries, dealers or professional investors that have been engaged by Templeton Global Advisors Limited to distribute shares of Franklin Templeton funds in certain jurisdictions. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase securities in any jurisdiction where it would be illegal to do so.

Important data provider notices and terms available at <a href="https://www.franklintempletondatasources.com">www.franklintempletondatasources.com</a>.



Please visit www.franklinresources.com to be directed to your local Franklin Templeton website.