Skip to content

David Zahn, Head of European Fixed Income, is cautiously optimistic about Europe’s economic outlook in 2026. In his view, German fiscal stimulus should have a material impact on both domestic growth and the broader region’s prospects. Challenges remain in some countries, given domestic political pressures, while geopolitics present an obvious macro risk. Nonetheless, stronger growth, contained inflation and stable monetary policy provide the conditions for a broadly constructive European fixed income investment environment. That said, a focus on valuations will likely determine a carefully considered approach.

The European Central Bank (ECB) cut rates aggressively in the first half of 2025 as part of its efforts to normalise monetary policy. The transmission effects of policy easing have started to feed into the real economy, with eurozone activity picking up in the second half of 2025, despite US tariffs, due to a recovery in domestic demand. This momentum is expected to be sustained, with eurozone growth estimated to increase to 1.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026 and to approximately 1.6% in 2027.1 With inflation now close to 2%, broadly in line with the ECB’s target, we expect the central bank to remain on hold for some time. Inflation has been brought under control—at least for now.

Pivotal to the stronger growth outlook will be whether Germany resumes its role as the principal driver of the eurozone economy, after experiencing broadly flat growth in recent years. We believe that the signs are encouraging.

Economic sentiment has improved since the announcement of a sizeable increase in fiscal spending: a €500 billion Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Transformation over 12 years (equating to approximately 11.5% of 2024 German GDP) and defence spending above 1% of GDP to be excluded from the so-called “debt brake” fiscal rules. In addition, the fiscal rules have been eased to exclude structural borrowing for the German regional states (Länder) up to 0.35% of their GDP annually. Given the scale and long-term nature of these measures, we expect the growth impact could be meaningful and prove relatively sustainable, generating positive spillover effects across the wider eurozone.

Indeed, despite Germany’s improving prospects, other core European economies remain comparatively weak. France remains in a state of political paralysis, with the 2026 budget yet to be resolved. Although the French National Assembly passed an emergency bill towards the end of 2025 to support government finances, more substantial action will be required. The budget deficit in 2025 reached 5.4% of GDP and we believe is unlikely to fall below 5% in 2026, with growth expected to remain weak, around 1% in 2026. Moreover, any fiscal progress is likely to be stymied as attention turns to the 2027 presidential elections, which will no doubt prolong the political turbulence.

In many ways, the eurozone today represents an inversion of the pre-global financial crisis period, when core economies were strong and peripheral countries struggled. Several former peripheral economies are among the stronger performers, with sovereign rating upgrades in Spain, Italy and Portugal during 2025, in contrast to rating downgrades for France, Belgium and Austria. Notably, Spain has made tangible progress in improving its public finances and reducing its budget deficit, which is expected to end 2025 at 2.5% of GDP.2 Strong consumption and supportive supply-side factors, such as higher immigration, have contributed to the Spanish economy’s outperformance relative to peers (2.8% year-over-year in the third quarter3), and this trend is expected to be maintained over the next year.4

From a sector standpoint, Europe’s defence sector is likely to be a key focus for growth and expansion in the coming years, with this urgency increasing following concerns about Greenland and a potential fracturing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. Against a backdrop of elevated geopolitical uncertainty—and with Europe increasingly unable to rely on the United States as the world’s primary security guarantor—we may see renewed efforts to build a more integrated European defence capability. The region’s defence industry remains highly fragmented, with the United Kingdom hosting the largest number of defence companies and accounting for the highest share of industry sales in Europe (approximately 25%).5 Defence spending across Europe is already rising, and we expect the coming decades to see a significant expansion of the sector, with positive spillovers for related industries, such as technology.

Based on our expectation that the eurozone region is likely to benefit from a German-led growth uplift, this leaves the question as to whether fiscal expansion translates into higher inflation. Recent prints have surprised on the downside, due to lower energy and food prices, although services inflation remains elevated. Overall, though, we expect eurozone inflation to remain slightly below the ECB’s 2% target throughout 2026. The legacy impact of stronger euro should help to suppress price pressures, in addition to normalising wage growth and relatively low energy prices, which has been mainly due to a rising oil-supply balance. However, we are mindful of energy prices’ vulnerability to a rising geopolitical risk premium. Counterintuitively, US tariffs could further suppress price pressures as China increasingly targets non-US export markets, although the data, so far, has not shown any strong evidence.

What does our macroeconomic outlook imply for eurozone yield curves?

We expect a curve steepening bias to be maintained, although focused between the intermediate- and long-dated sectors. This expectation reflects the substantial volume of government bond issuance forecast for 2026—notably from Germany—that will likely exert upward pressure on long-term yields. At the same time, demand for longer-dated bonds may weaken due to regulatory shifts. Dutch pension funds, historically major buyers of long-duration bonds, are transitioning from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes, reducing their need for long-dated assets. A key source of demand is expected to diminish, implying a higher-term premium than in the past.

Investors’ perceptions of ECB policy further out also supports our preference for the intermediate-dated sector. While we expect the ECB to remain on hold for an extended period, the possibility of rate hikes cannot be ruled out, particularly in early 2027 if growth improves as anticipated. Bond investors are beginning to tentatively price in this risk.

Outside of sovereigns, credit markets tend to benefit from a moderate growth backdrop. However, tight valuation levels keep us cautious, and we are maintaining light credit exposure within our portfolios. With spreads at multi-year lows, we believe that much of this optimism has already been priced across the quality spectrum. Even in euro high yield, we assess that valuations do not adequately compensate investors for the risks, given the overall improvement in quality, indicated by 70% of issuance currently rated BB.6 Credit markets could be vulnerable to higher levels of volatility in 2026, leaving scope for some spread widening that could present opportunities to add exposure selectively over time.

Finally, from a currency perspective, we expect some modest appreciation of the euro in 2026, given ongoing pressures on the US dollar and concerns about institutional governance. However, we believe that the euro is fairly valued following a strong performance in 2025. More attractive opportunities may lie in currencies such as the Norwegian krone, Swedish krona and Polish zloty. Norway’s growth outlook remains solid, supporting a “higher for longer” rate environment. Sweden’s open economy stands to benefit from improving European growth, while Poland, as the largest economy in central Europe, remains closely linked to Germany’s fortunes. As rates rise, we expect these currencies to appreciate gradually over the next six to 12 months.

Overall, we are cautiously optimistic about the year ahead, given an uplift to eurozone growth prospects amid moderate inflation trends. Headline political noise may cause some volatility, and we are seeking to keep our portfolios defensively positioned, focusing on intermediate-dated maturities. This stance should provide flexibility to potentially capture selective valuation opportunities, which we believe is particularly supportive of our active management approach.



IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

This material is intended to be of general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax advice. This material may not be reproduced, distributed or published without prior written permission from Franklin Templeton.

The views expressed are those of the investment manager and the comments, opinions and analyses are rendered as at publication date and may change without notice. The underlying assumptions and these views are subject to change based on market and other conditions and may differ from other portfolio managers or of the firm as a whole. The information provided in this material is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding any country, region or market. There is no assurance that any prediction, projection or forecast on the economy, stock market, bond market or the economic trends of the markets will be realized. The value of investments and the income from them can go down as well as up and you may not get back the full amount that you invested. Past performance is not necessarily indicative nor a guarantee of future performance. All investments involve risks, including possible loss of principal.

Any research and analysis contained in this material has been procured by Franklin Templeton for its own purposes and may be acted upon in that connection and, as such, is provided to you incidentally. Data from third party sources may have been used in the preparation of this material and Franklin Templeton ("FT") has not independently verified, validated or audited such data.  Although information has been obtained from sources that Franklin Templeton believes to be reliable, no guarantee can be given as to its accuracy and such information may be incomplete or condensed and may be subject to change at any time without notice. The mention of any individual securities should neither constitute nor be construed as a recommendation to purchase, hold or sell any securities, and the information provided regarding such individual securities (if any) is not a sufficient basis upon which to make an investment decision. FT accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss arising from use of this information and reliance upon the comments, opinions and analyses in the material is at the sole discretion of the user.

Franklin Templeton has environmental, social and governance (ESG) capabilities; however, not all strategies or products for a strategy consider “ESG” as part of their investment process.

Products, services and information may not be available in all jurisdictions and are offered outside the U.S. by other FT affiliates and/or their distributors as local laws and regulation permits. Please consult your own financial professional or Franklin Templeton institutional contact for further information on availability of products and services in your jurisdiction.

Issued in the U.S. by Franklin Templeton, One Franklin Parkway, San Mateo, California 94403-1906, (800) DIAL BEN/342-5236, franklintempleton.com. Investments are not FDIC insured; may lose value; and are not bank guaranteed.

You need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view and print PDF documents. Download a free version from Adobe's website.

CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are trademarks owned by CFA Institute.